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THE CARMACK AMENDMENT IN THE STATE COURTS.

P

RIOR to the leading case of Adams Express Co. v. Croninger,1
decided January 6th, 1913, there was much diversity in the
decisions of the state courts as to the validity of contracts between shippers and carriers limiting the amount of the carrier's
liability for injuries to goods shipped. Such limitations were held
valid in some states, but invalid in others, and in some were declared invalid by statutes or constitutional provisions.2 State rules
were applied to interstate as well as intrastate shipments, it being
supposed that Congress had not legislated upon the subject. The
CARMACK AMENDMENT of 19o63 provided that every carrier receiving property for interstate shipment should ·issue a receipt or
bill of lading therefor, and be liable for any injury to such property
caused by it or by any connecting carrier, and concluded with the
words "no contract, receipt, rule or regulation shall exempt such
common carrier, railroad or transportation company from the liability hereby imposed; Provided, th?-t nothing in this section sJ:iall
deprive any holder of such receipt or bill of lading of any remedy
or right of action which he had under existing law." It had been
thought, both by state and by federal courts, that the proviso above
quoted was intended to save to the shipper whatever rights he had
under existing state law; and accordingly both state and federal
courts continued to apply the rules, different in different jurisdictions, which had controlled before the passage of that amendment.'
In the Croninger case, however, it was held by the United States
Supreme Court that Congress had evinced, in the CARMACK AMENDMENT, an intention to assume control over the whole field of the
liability of common carriers on interstate shipments, and to supersede
and abrogate all state laws in relation thereto; and that the proviso
saving to the shipper his rights "'under existing, law" meant to save
him only such rights as he had under existing federal law. There
was no existing federal law forbidding contracts limiting the amount
of the carrier's liability (a limitation of amount not being an exemption within the meaning of the amendment), and such contracts
:i26 U. S. 49I, 33 Sup. Ct. I48, 57 L. Ed. 3I4, 44 L. R. A. N. S. :i57.
•See IS Col. L. Rev. 399, 475; 2I Harv. L. Rev. 32.
•Act June 29, I9o6: 34 Stat. at L. S9S. (c. 3S9I, §1), Comp. Stat, I9I3, §Bs92(n).
,. 'IS Col. L. Rev. 476, cases cited; Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Tharpe (I9I2),
I I 'Ga. A-pp. 465; Nonotuck Silk Co. v. Adams Express Co. (I9I2), 256 Ill. 66, 99
N. E. 893; 9 Mich. L. Rev. 233; I3 Cot L. Rev. 249. See Carpenter v. United States
Express Co. (I9I2), I2o Minn. 59, and note to Hooker v. Boston, etc. R. Co., Ann.
Cas. I9I2B 672, for discussions of the interpretation of the Carmack Amendment by
the state courts before its consideration by the United States Supreme Court.
1
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were therefore held to be valid, regardless of state rules or laws.
Immediately following that decision, and in accordance with the
doctrine there laid down, several state decisions holding such contracts invalid were reversed. 5 The same rule was held to apply to
contracts for the transportation of the baggage of a passenger, in
Boston & Maine R.R. v. Hooker, 6 where it was further held that
the filed and published tariffs were binding on both carrier and shipper, and that regulations therein (including limitation of liability)
were conclusively presumed to be a part of the contract of transportation. A year after the Hooker case, it was decided in Geo. N.
Pierce Co. v. Wells Fargo & Co.,7 that under the CARMACK AMENDMENT a contract limiting the amount of the carrier's liability for
goods shipped between states was valid even though the stipulated
amount was purely arbitrary and out of all proportion to the true
value of the shipment, and even though the carrier knew that such
true value was greatly in excess of the limit of liability. The theory
of all these decisions was that Congress intended by its legislation
to put all shippers of goods from state to state on precisely the same
basis, to do away with discrimination of any kind in interstate transportation, and to make the laws governing shipments between states
uniform and equal in their operation throughout the land.
The decision in the Croninger case, curtailing as it did the benefits
which shippers in some of the states had theretofore enjoyed because
of advantageous state laws, came as a distinct surprise, and was
subjected to not a little adverse criticism;8 but both state and federal
courts accepted it .as final, and accordingly limitations of the amount
of liability in interstate transportation were thereafter upheld by all
courts,9 although, of course, the sta~e rules were and are still ap•Chicago, St. P. M. & 0. Ry. Co. v. I,atta (1913), 226 U. S. 519, 33 Sup. Ct. 155,
57 I,. Ed. 328, reversing Latta v. -C~ag_o, St. P. M. & 0. Ry. Co. (1909), 172 Fed.
850, 97 C. C. A. 198, in which the federal court had held that state laws were not
abrogated by the Carmack Amendment; Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Miller (1913), 226
U. S. 513, 33 Sup. Ct. 155, 57 I,. Ed. 323, reversing Miller v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co.
(1909), 85 Neb. 458, 123 N. W. 449; Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Carl (1913), 227
U. S. 639, 33 Sup. Ct. 391, 57 I,. Ed. 683, reversing Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v.
Carl (1909), 91 Ark. 97, 121 S. W. 932, 134 Am. St. Rep. 56; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co.
v. Harriman (1913), 227 U. S. 6.!\7• 33 Sup. Ct. 397, 57 I,. Ed. 690, reversing Missouri
K. & T. R. ·Co. v. Harriman, (Tex. Civ. App. 1910), 128 S. W. 932.
• (1914), 233 U. S. 97, 3'4 Sup. Ct. 526,. 58 I,. Ed. 868, I,. R. A. 1915B, 450. See
9 Ill I,. Rev. 359; I Va. I,. Rev. 405.
T (1915), 236 U. S. 278, 35 Sup. Ct. 351, 59 I,. Ed. 576. For comment on this case
before and after its decision by the United States Supreme Court see 10 Mich. I,. Rev.
317, and 13 Mich. I,. Rev. 590.
•See 76 Cent. I,. J. 243; I I Mich. I,. Rev. 46o.
•Collins v. Railroad Co. (1915), 96 Kans. 581, 152 Pac. 649; American Brake Shoe
Co. v. Pere Marquette R. Co. (1915), 223 Fed. 1018; Michelson v. Judson Forwarding
Co. (1915), 268 Ill 546, 109 ~· E. 281; Adams Express Co. v. Welborn (1915), 59 Ind.
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plicable to intrastate shipments.10 The CUMMINS AMENDMENT11 of
1915, however, provided the necessary federal law on the subject,
and expressly declar.ed invalid any contract limiting the amount of
the carrier's liability, though providing for a bona fide declaration
of value, conclusive as against both parties, in the case of goods concealed from view.
But although the courts of those states in which contracts limiting
the amount of the carrier's liability had formerly been held invalid
were bound to follow the Croninger case, with its construction of the
CARMACK AMENDMENT, since "it is the special prerogative of the
Supreme Court of the United States to construe federal statutes,"12
they did so reluctantly, and some of them have expressed their disapproval of the rule of that case in no uncertain terms. The North
Carolina court even went out of its way in a case involving only an
intrastat~ shipment18 to express its opinion of the Supreme Court
decision, remarking: "We do not see how such language [referring
·to the CARMACK AMENDMENT] can be construed to put life into a
stipulation limiting liability, .and give it the effect of preventing a
full recovery."
A recent Ohio case--Erie R. Co. v. Steinberg,1'-presents a particularly striking· and interestinj(illustration of the attitude of these
state courts toward the Supr~e Court's interpretation of the CARMACK AME~DMENT. The plaintiff had purchased a ticket am:r
checked her trunk thereon from Toledo to Youngstown. The trunk
was lost through defendant's negligence, and plaintiff sued for its.
full value. Defendant's schedule of rates, rules, and regulations, on
file with the Interstate Commerce Commission and with the Public
Utilities Commission of Ohio, purported to limit its liability to $100-l
§ 8994(1), General Code of Ohio, is an exact copy of the CARMACK
AMENDMENT, with the single exception that its provisions are made
to apply only to intrastate transportation. The Ohio court was~
therefore confronted with exactly the same problem which had conApp. 330, Io8 N. :r;. I63; Zoller Hop Co. v. Southern Pac. Co. (I9I4), 72 Ore. 262,
143 Pac. 93I; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Miller (1914), 156 Ky. 677, 162 S. W. 73 i.
Hera: v. Adams Express Co. (i913), SS Pa. Super. Ct. 378; Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co.
v. Walston (1913), 37 Okla. 5I7, 133 Pac. 42; United States Express Co. v. Cohn (1913),
108 Ark. us, 157 S. W. 144 (commented on in 41 Wash. I,. Rep. 577); Southern Ry.
Co. v. Bynum (Ala. 191s), 6g SC?. 820; Donoho v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. (Mo. App.
I9I6), I87 S. W. I4I; 48 Am. I,. Rev. so.
10 Wise v. Atlantic Coast J,ine Co. (191s), IOI S. C s10, 86 S. :r;. 22 (com·
mented in in I4 Mich. I,. Rev. 64); Cooper v. Norfolk Southern R. R. Co. (1913), I6I
N,,~ 400, 77 S.
339 (commented on in 23 Yale I,. ]. 95).
· ·•11 38 Stat. at I,. n96.
"Street v. Delta Mining Co. (1910), 42 Mont. 37I, 382.
"Cooper v. Norfolk Southern R. Co. (I913), 161 N. C 400, 77 S. E. 339.
" (Ohio, 1916), 113 N. :r;. 814-

:r:.
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fronted the United States Supreme Court in Boston &·Maine R.R.
v. H ookcr, supra; but it reached a diametncally opposite conclusion,
which it justified on the following grounds: First, that the action
was, in form, one for conversion instead of· for breach of contract,
as it was in the Hooker case. A few decisions have appeared, evidently engendered in the desire already remarked to avoid the consequences of the Supreme Court ruling, which lend some force to
such a distinction. In Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Truitt,1 6
it was .held by the Georgia court that where a conversion oy a carrier
of goods shipped has been the result of gross or wilful negligence,
such carrier will be deemed to have abandoned the contract of shipment, and cannot thereafter insist on a stipulation therein· limiting
the amount of its liability; and, further, that where a conversion has
occurred the burden of disproving such gross or wilful negligence
is on the carrier. But the contrary conclusion has been reached in
better considered cases, holding that the effect of such a stipulation
under the CARMACK AMENDMENT cannot be escaped. by the mere
form of the action.18 In a well argued dissenting opinion in the Ohio.
case Justice ]ONES pointed out that the tendency of the United States
Supreme Court cases was strongly againi;t the idea that the result
of its decisions could be avoided by merely changing the form of the
action. Such a distinction would certainly not :;utfice to justify ii-.
holding contrary. to the d~cisions already rendered in the federal
Supreme Court, if the case concerned interstate transportation; and
it would therefore seem to M a highly unsatisfactory basis for the
refusal of the state court in an intrastate case to follow the doctrihe
laid down in those decisions. But the Ohio court also based its conclusion on the proposition, second, th;it a different construction
should be placed on the Ohio stat~te, copied from the CARMACK
AMENDMENT, from that placed upon the amendment itself by the
United States Supreme Court. Although it is a common principle
of statutory construction that when the legislature of one state or
country adopts a statute of a sister state or country, the construction
placed upon that statute by the courts of the jurisdiction from which
it was borrowed will ordinarily be followed,17 this is not a binding
rule, and courts are at liberty to depart from it, especially as regards
a construction by the courts of the parent state or country occurring
subsequent to its adoption therefrom. The Ohio statute in question
was passed in r9n, and the construction of the CARMACK AMEND11 (1915) 17 Ga. App. 236, 86 S. E. 421 (commented on in 14 Mich. I,. Rev. 141).
'"F. W. Brockman Commission Co. v. Missouri Pac. Ry Co. (Mo. App. 1916), 188
S. \V. 920; D'Utassy v. Adams Express Co. CN. Y. 1916), n4 N. E. 786.
1 • Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. (1892), 145
263.
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MENT by the United States Supreme Court in the Croninger case
was announced in I9I3. The Ohio court refused to adopt that construction for its own statute, and this for several reasons, the first
of which i~ said to be that uniformity of intrastate and interstate
laws is desirable, and that a different construction is necessary for
uniformity, since the CUMMINS AMENDME!'l'T has changed the law
applicable to interstate shipments. As the court itself says, should
the Ohio statute be construed in accordance with the construction
of the CARMACK AMENDMENT by the Supreme Court, «it would be
necessary for the general assepibly of this state, if it desires uniformity of state and interstate commerce laws, to amend that section to conform to the provisions of the CuMMINS AMENDMENT.
However, the conclusion this court has reached makes such an
amendment unnecessary." Even apart from the fact that a holding
based on such an argument would be practically a self-styled piece
of judicial legislation, it is difficult to see, as the dissenting opinion
points out, how the CUMMINS AMENDMENT could affect the case,
for the cause of action arose nearly two years before that amendment was passed.18 But it is further urged by the Ohio court that
Congress, by passing the CUMMINS AMENDMENT, indicated that the
construction placed upon the CARMACK AMEI!U>MENT by the Supreme
Court was not in accordance with its .intention, and hence that the'
legislature of Ohio did not intend such a consti:uction of its statute,
for "the intent of the General Assembly of Ohio when it passed that
section must have been identical with the intent of Congress when it
passed the CARMACK AMENDMENT.'' This view of the reason for
the CUMMINS AMENDMENT has not been taken by the courts of other
states. For example, in Colby v. American E~press Co.19 the New
Hampshire court declared that "the act of March 4, I9IS, appears
to intend a change of the law, and not to be a declaration of the
meaning of a statute now in force." But whether that view is corred:
or not, the argument of the Ohio court, though it shifts ·the unpleasant responsibility of renouncing the Supreme Court's interpretation of the CARMACK AMENDMENT to the broad shoulders of Congress, really amounts to a declaration that it does not agree with the
ruling of the Supreme Court; and does not propose to follow it. And
this seems to be the only valid reason given for its· decision-the
court's convictioit that the CARMACK AMENDMENT did not mean what
the Supreme Court had said it meant. As has been remarked before, the Ohio court is not alone in that conviction.
''.ssNote, in this connection, Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Jones (1915), 192 Ala. 532,
68 So. 871, in which the Alabama court declined to read the Cummins Amendment into
its state law for the sake of nniformity•
.. (1915), '11 N. H. 548, 94 AtL 198.
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After thus justifying, at some length, in an argument not inaptly
termed, in Justice J ONJ~s' dissenting opinion, a "remarkable apologia,''
its refusal to be bound by the Supreme Co~rt's construction of the
federal statute, the Ohio court in the Steinberg case proceeded to
construe its local statute in accordance with its own ideas of statutory
construction, in the light of local laws and conditions, and reached
the conclusion that a contract limiting the amount of a carrier's
liability for property shipped, which was not a bona fide agreement
as to its value, was invalid under that statute. It would seem that
the whole matter could have been disposed of with less effort and
much more simply. The United States Supreme Court had interpreted the proviso in the CARMACK AMENDMEN'l' saving to the shipper his rights "ilnder existing law" to mean "under existing federal
law." There was no existing feder;:i.l law invalidating contracts
limiting the amount of a carrier's liability, since they were not prohibited by the amendment itself as interpreted by the court; and
therefore such contracts were held to be valid, with reference to
interstate transportation. But the S?-me proviso appears in the· Ohio
statute, and must, refer, of course, to existing Ohio law. And for
that law the Ohio court was not confined to the statute, nor to any
statute, but might have looked to prior Ohio decisions, in which it
had more than once been held, as it was held in the Steinberg case,
that a clause in a receipt or bill of lading or elsewhere limiting t!Je
amount of a carrier's liability for negligence was not binding, even
though less was charged and paid for carriage by reason of the
insertion of such clause.20
In cases involving interstate shipments, the reluctance of many
state- courts to extend the doctrine of the Croninger case has manifested itself in a tendency to limit it~ application closely to cases involving essentially the same facts as were presented by the United
States Supreme Court decisions, and to reach a conclusion without
reference to those decisiops in cases involving facts eve~ slightly
different. The Supreme Court, on the other hand, has shown a
decided inclination not to limit the effect of its holding, but to apply
it freely and broadly. The result has been a series of efforts on the
part of these state courts to find distinctions whereby they might
justify the application of rules different from that applied by the
Supreme Court, which efforts have often been nullified by subsequent
decisions in the latter court when the same or similar problems have
been presented to it. For example, some time after the decision in
,. United States l!;xp. Co. v. Bachman (1875), 2 Cin. Sup. Ct. R. 251 (affirmed in
28 Oh. St. 144); Pennsylvania Co. v. Yoder (1903), 15 0. C. D. 32; Ambach v. B. & 0.
R. Co. (Il!93), 4 S. & C. P. Dec. 467; Jacobson v. Adams Express Co. (1885), I 0. C.
D. 212.
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the Croninger case, it was held by the Oklahoma court21 that an
undervaluation of goods shipped ·was not binding on either carrier
or shipper where the carrier had actual knowledge of the true value,
because the result of such a wilful undervaluation was a discrimination forbidden by the Er.KINS Acr. 22 Such a decision would seem
to have been justified by· prior decisions of the United States Supreme Court, in which it had apparently indicated that its ruling in
the Croninger case would not be applied in a case similar to that presented to the Oklahoma court ;23 but it w;;i.s overthrown very shortly
afterward in the case of Geo. N. Pierce Co. v. Wells, Fargo & Co.,
supra, where it was held by the Supreme Court that a contract limiting the carrier's liability to $So on a shipment of automobiles worth
$15,000 precluded recovery by the shipper of more than the stipulated amount. The North Carolina court, which has already been
referred to as one of those which strongly disapproved the rule of
the Croninger case, held, in a case involving the validity of a stipulation in a ~ill of lading limiting the carrier's liability for delay,2 ' that
delay was not a "loss, damage; or injury" to property within the
meaning of the CARMACK AMJ;:NDMJ;:NT, and it therefore concluded,
by a curious process of reasoning, that Congress did not, by that
amendment, intend to abrogate the state laws i!1 regard to liability
therefor. Accordingly; the North Carolina rule was applied, and the'
limitation was held invalid. Such a decision was certainly not in
line with the attitude of the United States Supreme Court, and it is
not surprising that when the question was presented to the latter
court it declined to approve of the effort to. limit the effect of its
interpretation of the' law, but held that limitations of amount of
liability for delay were within the scope of its former decisions and·
were valid.25
In still another class of cases, a supposed loophole of escape from
the operation of the doctrine of the Croninger case was closed by
later decisions of the United States Supreme Court, viz., cases involving the question of the liability of the r~ilroad or other transportation company after it had ceased to be a carrier, and had become
a warehouseman. It was thought by a few courts that, though a
stipulation l,imiting the amount of liability was valid so long as the
21 St. Louis & S. 'I!. R. Co. v. Mounts (1914), 44 Okla. 359, 144 Pac. 1036.
n 32 Stat. at I,. 847, c. 708.
•
n Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Carl (1913), 227 U. S. 639, 33 Sup. Ct. 391, 57
L, .Ed. 683; Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Harriman (1913), 227 U. S. 657, 33 Sup.
c~~s91, 57 r.. ltd. Ggo.
'"'Byers v. Southern Express Co. (1914), 165 N. C. 542, 81 S. E. 741.
• 11 N.

Y. Phila. & Norfolk Ry. Co. v. Peninsula Product Exchange of Marylaud
See 14 Mich. I,. Rev. 498.

(1916), 240 U. S. 34, 36 Sup. Ct. 230. 60 I,. Ed. 5i1.
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relation of carrier and shipper existed, when that relation terminated
it had spent its force, and that the validity of such a limitation during the ensuing relation of warehouseman should be governed by
state, rather than federal, law. 26 It was so held by the Ohio Court
of Appeals in Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R':y. Co. v. Dettlebach, and the
Supreme Court of that state declined to review a judgment for the
full market value of goods destroyed by the defendant's negligence
after it had ceased to be a carrier and had become a warehouseman
wi* relation thereto. But this case was reversed by the United
States Supreme Court, and it was there held that the rule of liability
limitation applied in the Croninger case was applicable not only to
the service of the transportation c01~pany as a carrier but to its ser¥ices as warehouseman as well. 27 The same rule was laid down in the
later case of Southern R. Co. v. Prescott, 28 holding that the provisions of the bill of lading govern even where the goods are allowed
to remain in the carrier's warehouse after giving receipt therefor and
payment of freight; and in the very recent case of Western Transit
Co. v. Leslie Co.,2 8 • where a ton of copper was stolen from the carrier's warehouse after it had been in storage therein, pursuant to an
arrangement with the carrier, for nearly four months, it was held
that a limitation of liability in the bill of lading and the filed and published tariff was oper.ative and binding. But even in spite of so definite a statement of the law by the United States Supreme Court, the
Texas Court of Appeals, in a recent decision, has ignored it, and held
in accordance with the prior Ohio case and its own state rule. 29
In still other decisions, involving questions which have not yet
been passed upon by the United States Supreme Court, the reluctance with which many courts accept its ruling in the matter under
discussion is manifest. For example, it was held by the Arkansas
court30 that a contract limiting the amount of the carrier's liability
was invalid where the shipper had no choice of rates, because there
was no consideration for such a contract, as there was in those cases
where an agreed valuation was based on a lower rate; and by the
Kansas City Court of Appeals31 that a carrier cannot absolve itself
""Prescott v. Railway Co. (1914), 99 S. C. 422, 83 S. E. 781.
2T Cleveland, C. C. & St. I,. Ry. Co. v. Dettlebach (Jan. 1916), 239 U. S. 588, 36
Sup. Ct. in, 60 L. Ed. 453 (commented on in 14 Mich. L. Rev. 497).
23 (Apr. 1916), 240 U. S. 632, 36 Sup. Ct. 469, 6o L. Ed. 836 (commented on in
14 Mich I,. Rev. 676), reversing Prescott v. Railway Co., supra.
:aa Decided Jan. 7, 1917. 37 Sup. Ct. - .
20 Hamilton Mill & Elevator Co. v. Stephenv.ille N. & S. T. Ry. Co. (Tex. Civ.
App., Oct., 1916), 189 S. W. 774·
...Kansas City & M. Ry. Co. v. Oakley (1914), us Ark. 20, 170 S. W. 565.
n Morrison Grain Co. v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. (1914), 182 Mo. App. 339, 170 S.
W.404.
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from its common law liability by a stipulation in an independent
contract, not a part of the contract of transportation. The Alabama
court32 approved the doctrine that contracts limiting the carrier's
common law liability are to be construed very strictly against the carrier, and decided that no such contract is valid which is not in the
exact form prescribed by the rules of the Interstate Commerce Commission. It held, therefore, that it was proper to instruct a jury
that the carrier could not limit its liability for negligence by a mere
stipulation in a bill of lading. Similarly, the Mississippi court38 held
that where a contract' limiting the amount of the carrier's liability
was made in consideration of a lower rate, but it was not shown
that the rate so given was based upon a schedule of rates filed with
and approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission, the rule of
the Croninger case was not applicable, and the full value of the
shipment was recoverable.
.
A particularly interesting group of cases have dealt with that part
of the CARMACK AMENDMENT 'Yhich required every carrier to issue
a receipt or bill of lading therefor, and have decided that, even under
the terms of that amendment, such a receipt or bill of lading is not
essential to a valid contract of transportation. In the words of the
Kansas City Court of Appeals in Morrison Grain Co. v. Mo. Pac.
Ry. Co.,84 hol~ing that the liability of a carrier on an interstate shipment may commence before the issuance of any receipt or bill
of lading, "if the carrier chose to accept and begin the transportation
of goods without issuing a bill of lading, it would be violating the
act referred to [the CARMACK AMENDMENT] but the relation of
shipper and carrier ~ould exist none the less." And this seems to
be the accepted rule.35 In American E%press Co. v. Merlen, 86 the
application of this rule resulted in a conclusion by the Oklahoma
court that where the contract of carriage had been completed before
the issuance of the required receipt, without any specific declaration
as to value, the carrier was liable for the full value of the shipment,
regardless of any filed or published schedules, or of the terms of a
receipt subsequently issued and accepted by the shipper. Such a decision apparently involves a holding that filed and published tariffs
are not conclusively presumed to be a part of the contract of carriage; but, as regards interstate transportation, this is evidently opn Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Broda (1914), 19<> Ala. 266, 67 So. 437.
nyazoo & M. V.·R. Co. v. Peoples (1913), 106 Miss. 6o4, 64 So. 26::.

... (1914), 182 Mo. App. 339, l7o S. W. 40+
11 Davis v. Norfolk & S. R. Co. CN. C. 1916), go S. E. 123; American Express Co.
Merten (1914), 42 Okla: 492, 141 Pac. u6g.
• (1914), 42 Okla. 492, 141 Pac. u69.

v.
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posed to the holdings of the United States Supreme Court and of
other state courts.87
It is now well settled that where the carrier's liability is limited
by stipulation to a certain amount per ton or hundredweight its
liability in case of loss or damage to a part only of the shipment will
be limited to the stipulated value per ton or hundredweight of the
part lost or injured.38 . A few earlier cases have held otherwise, taking the view that this method of valuation was simply a means of
arriving at a total value for the whole shipment, and that the liability
for loss of part was limited only by such total value.89 The United
States Supreme Court, however, in Kansas City R. Co. v. Carl.;' 0
decided the rule to be as first stated as regards a shipment composed
of several separate parts or parcels; and in Western Transit Co. v.
Leslie Co., supra, the same rule was applied where the carrier's liability for a carload of copper metal was limited to $100 per ton. But
where the stipulated amo.unt purports to be the total value of the
goods shipped without regard to weight or parcels, or to be an agreement as to the maximum liability for the whole shipment, the rule is
not so clear. Those state courts which have considered the matter
have declined to extend the doctrine of the United States Suprt1me
Court decisions to include such cases, and have held that the liability
for loss of a part is limited only by the total agreed value or maximum liability;u On the other hand, a case ·in the federal circuit
court has held, without argument or citation of authority, that the
liability for loss of a part only of a carload of goods shipped under
a contract limiting the liability to a stated amount for the whole carload is limited to such proportion of that amount
the property
destroyed bears to the whole shipment.42
'
·
The CUMMINS AMENDMSN't has set at rest the problems presented
in a few of the cases referred to in this article; but it has left others

as

:n Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Carl, a27 U. S. 639, 33 Sup. Ct. 391, 57 I,. U
683; Boston & Maine R. R. v. Hooker~ 233 U.S. 97, 34 Sup. Ct. 526, 58 I,. U 868;
Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Robinson, 233 U. S. 173, 34 Sup. Ct. 556, 58 I,. Ed. 901 ; Panbandle
& S. F. Ry. Co. v. Bell (Tex. Civ. App. 1916), l8g S. W. 1097: Colby v. American
Express Co. (1915), n N. H. 548, 94 At!. 198; Clingan v. C. C. C. & St. I,. Ry. Co.
(1913), 184 Ill. App. 202; Zoller Hop Co. v. Southern Pac. Co. (1914), 72 Ore. 262, 143
Pac. 931. See 27 Harv. I,. Rev. 737, for a criticism of this rule as laid down in the
Hooker case. And see Harris· v. Southern Ry. Co. (1915), 100 S. C. 469, 85 S. E. 158,
and comment thereon in 25 Yale I,. ]. 81 •
.. United I,ead Co. v. I,ehigh Valley R. Co. (1913), 156 App. Div. 525, 141 N. Y.
Supp. 310.
ao Huguelet v. Warfield (1909), 84 S. C. 87, 65 S. E. 985; Carleton v. Union Transfer
& Storage Co. (1909), 137 App. Div. 225, 121 N. Y. Supp. 997.
"' (1913), 227 U. S. 639, 33 Sup. Ct. 391, 57 I,. Ed. 683.
"Visanska v. Southern Express Co. (1912), 92 S. C. 573, 75 S. E. 962; Central of
Georgia R. Co. v. Broda (1914), 190 Ala. 266, 67 So. 437.
42 Shelton v. Canadian Northern Ry. Co. (19u), 189 Fed. 153·
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still unsettled, and itself presents still others which will undoubtedly
be disclosed in cases soon to be before the courts.43 For instance, as
regards the class of cases discussed in the preceding paragraph, it
will be interesting to note what rule is to be applied in determining
the carrier's liability for loss or damage to a part only of goods concealed from view, the value of which has been declared by the shipper in accordance with that amendment. This and many other questions remain to be considered; and it cannot be definitely stated in
advance just how far state rules and how far federal rules will be
applied in deciding them.
WAYLAND H. SANFORD.
University of Michigan Law School.
.. See 33 I. C. C. R. 683 and 36 id. 84 for discussions by the Interstate Commerce
Commissio2l as to the effect of the Cummins Amendment.

